bunzip2: reject blocks whose run-length count overflows
Based ob the patch by Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>: > get_next_block() accumulates a run length in the unsigned 32-bit runCnt: > > runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); > > A crafted stream with a long enough RUNA/RUNB sequence can drive runCnt > up to ~2^32. Once it is that large, the existing guard > > if (dbufCount + runCnt > bd->dbufSize) > > is bypassed: dbufCount + runCnt overflows the unsigned addition and > wraps to a small value, so the check passes. The following > byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt then overflows byteCount[] (an int) to a > negative value. The inverse Burrows-Wheeler sort loop computes negative > cumulative offsets from it and writes before the start of dbuf[], an > out-of-bounds heap write (confirmed with AddressSanitizer as a write 48 > bytes before the dbuf allocation). function old new delta get_next_block 1452 1458 +6 Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
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@@ -463,13 +463,12 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
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symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this
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context). Thus space is saved. */
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runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
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//The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen.
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//This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow):
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// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
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// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
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// runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
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// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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// }
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/* Catch 32-bit overflow (we have an example .bz2 file) */
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if ((int)runCnt < 0) {
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dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
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runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
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return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
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}
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if (runPos < bd->dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
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goto end_of_huffman_loop;
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}
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@@ -568,6 +568,18 @@ if test "${0##*/}" = "bunzip2.tests"; then
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echo "FAIL: $unpack: bz2_issue_12.bz2 corrupted example"
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FAILCOUNT=$((FAILCOUNT + 1))
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fi
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# specially crafted file to attack the
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# runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
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# code, making (dbufCount + runCnt) overflow 32 bits and become small.
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# (there is a fix now which catches when runCnt reaches 0x80000000)
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errout="`${bb}bunzip2 <bz2_runcnt_overflow.bz2 2>&1 >/dev/null`"
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if test x"$errout:$?" = x"bunzip2: bunzip error -5:1"; then
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echo "PASS: $unpack: bz2_runcnt_overflow.bz2 corrupted example"
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else
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echo "FAIL: $unpack: bz2_runcnt_overflow.bz2 corrupted example"
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FAILCOUNT=$((FAILCOUNT + 1))
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fi
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fi
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exit $((FAILCOUNT <= 255 ? FAILCOUNT : 255))
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